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THE ‘INFODEMIC’: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW READY TO COMBAT  





During the COVID-19 pandemic, a variety of false claims have widely 
been circulated on social media. These include claims about the origins 
of the virus (for example, claims that the United States military 
introduced the virus to Wuhan), 1  various health information, 2  and 
rumours about inefficacy and danger of vaccination. 3  The Vice 
President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency 
described this phenomenon a coronavirus ‘infodemic’, in which false 
or misleading information has harmed the health of citizens, negatively 
affected the economy, and undermined the response of public 
authorities.4 So-called ‘fake news’, which emerged as a political issue 
 
* Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Senior Fellow, Stockton 
Center for International Law, United States (US) Naval War College. The 
author is grateful to Associate Professor Aurel Sari for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author 
and not those of the US Government, the US Department of the Navy, or the 
US Naval War College.  
1 V Molter and G Webster, ‘Coronavirus Conspiracy Claims: What’s Behind 
a Chinese Diplomat’s COVID-19 Misdirection’, Internet Observatory 
(Stanford Cyber Policy Center, 31 March 2020), available at 
<https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/china-covid19-origin-narrative>.  
2 J Goodman, ‘Coronavirus: Compulsory Vaccines in the UK and Other 
Rumours Fact-Checked’, BBC News (9 May 2020), available at 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/52565764>; P Howard et al, ‘The COVID-19 
“Infodemic”: What Does the Misinformation Landscape Look Like and How 
Can We Respond?’ (Oxford Internet Institute, 15 April 2020), available at 
<https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/the-covid-19-infodemic-what-does-the-
misinformation-landscape-look-like-and-how-can-we-respond/>.  
3 R Horton, ‘Offline: Managing the COVID-19 Vaccine Infodemic’ (2020) 397 
The Lancet 1474. 
4 V Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission for Values and 
Transparency, Speech in response to Disinformation around COVID-19, 
Brussles, 10 June 2020, available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1033>. 
See also ‘Cross-Regional Statement on “Infodemic” in the Context of 
COVID-19’ (12 June 2020), available at 
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in modern democracies, has entered a new phase with a far-reaching 
impact on the general public, extending to areas that are supposedly 
non-partisan, such as the protection of public health in the fight against 
the spread of infectious disease. 
The fabrication of information, which ‘mimics news media content in 
form but not in organisational process or intent’, 5  has gained 
asymmetrical influence on the individual perception of real-world 
events and political choices. This is largely due to the widespread 
exploitability of information on the internet generally, and social media 
more specifically. Harmful influences may arise from any false or 
misleading information (‘misinformation’) but are of particular concern 
when such information is generated and circulated with the specific 
purpose of deceiving people (‘disinformation’). This is because the 
ability to exploit online communication adds to the modern tools of 
information operations as a means of foreign interference and 
sabotage.6 The manipulation of information for deceptive purposes has 
gained force by taking advantage of the increased ability to disseminate 
misinformation effectively on social media. 
Indeed, the European Union has identified that foreign countries, 
particularly Russia and China, have engaged in targeted influence 
operations and disinformation campaigns around COVID-19 to 
undermine the credibility of the Union and its response to the 
coronavirus pandemic.7  Disinformation campaigns conducted during 
COVID-19 pandemic, especially those involving Chinese and Russian 




5 D M Lazer et al, ‘The Science of Fake News’ (2018) 359 Science 1094-1096. 
6 See, eg, R E Guandagno and Karen Guttieri, ‘Fake News and Information 
Warfare: An Examination of the Political and Psychological Processes from 
the Digital Sphere to the Real World’ in I E Chiluwa and S A Samoilenko (eds), 
Handbook of Research on Deception, Fake News, and Misinformation Online 
(IGI Global 2019) 167. 
7 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, 
the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Tackling COVID-19 
Disinformation – Getting the Facts Right’ (10 June 2020) JOIN(2020) 8 final 
at 3; EEAS Special Report Update: Short Assessment of Narratives and 
Disinformation Around the COVID-19 Pandemic (1 April 2020), available at 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-
narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid-19-pandemic/.  
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for the purposes of disruption and destabilisation.8 The diffused nature 
of the threat that such hostile information operations pose to national 
security is likely to test the protective value of international law, as 
national authorities struggle in developing their regulatory responses to 
information disorder.  
This article considers the readiness of international law to protect States 
from information operations that are launched as the means of 
disrupting government response to the spread of infectious diseases, 
such as COVID-19. There are relevant rules of international law that 
impose restrictions on national authorities for their involvement in the 
dissemination of misinformation and for their response to such 
activities. However, the unique online information environment, in 
which various individuals are involved in the de-centralized process of 
creating and disseminating misinformation with or without various 
degrees of State support, enables hostile actors to work across the 
traditional boundaries of these rules. A lack of awareness about this 
complex environment by solely focusing on State-sponsored 
information operations fails to appreciate the unique challenge that has 
been posed to national authorities in managing public response to a 
public health crisis. As such, this article examines both the external- 
and internal-facing dynamics for international regulation of 
misinformation, with the focus on the principle of non-intervention as 
an external regulation of misinformation under general international 
law and freedom of expression guaranteed under human rights treaties 
for internal regulation.  
 
II THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION 
States are not prohibited from spreading misinformation under 
international law, with the exception of a few specific areas. The 
broadcasting of false information is regulated under the International 
Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, under 
which a limited number of States Parties have agreed to undertake to 
prohibit and stop any transmission of false statements when it is ‘likely 
to harm good international understanding. 9  Under the International 
 
8  See, eg, S-D D Bachmann, D Lee and A Dowse, ‘COVID Information 
Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition’ (2020) 44 Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 11-18. 
9 International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause 
of Peace, adopted 23 September 1936, 186 LNTS 301 (entered into force 2 
April 1938) art 3(1). Australia, along with France, Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom, denounced it in the 1980s. For analysis, see B Baade, ‘Fake News 
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Telecommunication Union’s Radio Regulations, States have an 
obligation not to send false or misleading signals,10 but this applies to 
the identification of its transmitter rather than to the substance of a 
transmission. The Montreal Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation merely prescribes criminalising 
the unlawful and intentional communication of information when it is 
known to be false and endangers the safety of an aircraft in flight.11  
Nevertheless, deliberate interferences with domestic affairs of another 
State through the dissemination of misinformation may amount to an 
intervention prohibited under customary international law. The 
principle of non-intervention prohibits States from committing an act 
of intervention, directly or indirectly, in the domestic affairs that fall 
within the exclusive competence of another State. 12  It remains 
contentious whether the scope of the exclusive competence is 
determined by the inherent attributes of sovereignty reserved under 
international law,13 or by taking into account various factors as found 
in the actual practice of States and international organisations.14 At any 
rate, within the current framework of international law, there is little 
doubt that the choice of public health system, and the formulation of 
regulatory response to infectious diseases, falls within the exclusive 
 
and International Law’ (2018) 29 European Journal of International Law 1357, 
1365-69. 
10 Radio Regulations, adopted 2 November 2016 (entered into force 1 January 
2017) art 18. 
11 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, adopted 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 
January 1973) art 1(e). 
12  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970); Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res 2131 (XX) (1965). 
13  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108 para 205 (holding that a 
prohibited intervention must ‘be one bearing on matters in which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely’). 
14 See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Advisory Opinion) 
[1932] PCIJ (Ser B) No 4, 24 (observing that the scope of the exclusive 
competence of the State is ‘an essentially relative question’ and ‘depends on 
the development of international relations’). 
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competence of the State, considering that it is also reserved as an 
exception to various treaty commitments.15 
The relevant question is rather whether the dissemination of 
misinformation, with a view to or an effect of undermining regulatory 
efforts to control or contain the spread of virus, amounts to an 
intervention prohibited under this principle. This is because an element 
of coercion is considered as the very essence of prohibited 
intervention,16 although various views have been expressed in literature 
about this element from those equating it with forcible measures to the 
idea that even non-forcible, political influence could amount to an 
intervention.17 Depending on the substantive standard applied to assess 
coerciveness, the disruption of a public health system with the 
dissemination of misinformation could amount to an intervention, in 
cases where such an operation is attributable to the State. 
Of particular relevance is General Assembly Resolution 36/103, which 
lists a wide range of interferences as constituting an intervention. It 
relevantly refers to the duty of a State to ‘abstain from any defamatory 
campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of 
intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of other States’.18 It also 
enjoins States to refrain from the exploitation and distortion of human 
rights issues as a means of interference, exerting pressure on other 
States or creating distrust and disorder within and among States.19 
Although this resolution was adopted by majority, its status under 
customary international law has been in doubt due to the objection of 
many Western states. 20  Indeed, various forms of non-forcible 
interference ranging from lobbying, propaganda broadcasting, and the 
dissemination of false information have been commonplace in state 
practice. This was particularly the case during the Cold War when the 
 
15 See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 12(3), 
19(3), 21, 22(2) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
16 Nicaragua judgment, above n 13, 108 para 205. 
17 See, eg, S Watts, ‘Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-
Intervention’ (2015) 14 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 137, 146-9; M 
Jamnejad and M Wood, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention’ (2009) 22 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 345, 368-77; L F Damrosch, ‘Politics Across 
Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs’ 
(1989) 83 American Journal of International Law 1, 3-4. 
18 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States, GA Res 36/103 (1981) para II(j). 
19 Ibid, para II(l).   
20 Adopted by 120 to 22, with 6 abstentions.  
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superpowers were competing with attempts to exert transnational 
political influence in different parts of the world.21 
However, with the increased vulnerability to hostile cyber operations 
and associated exploitation of social media, there are indications that 
western States are becoming more amenable to lowering the bar for the 
assessment of coerciveness as the requisite element of intervention.22 
While acknowledging that there is no consensus among States on the 
precise boundaries of this principle, Jeremy Wright, the former 
Attorney-General of the United Kingdom, referred to the manipulation 
of the electoral system to alter the results of an election in another 
country, intervention in the fundamental operation of Parliament or in 
the stability of financial system as practical examples of prohibited 
intervention.23 Likewise, in the United States, the General Counsel of 
the Department of Defense Paul Ney has labelled a cyber operation that 
interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or that 
tampers with another country’s election results as clear examples of 
prohibited intervention,24 drawing verbatim from the remarks made by 
Brian Egan as Legal Adviser to the Department of State. 25  It is 
nevertheless plausible to envisage situations where these hostile 
operations are conducted simply as malicious acts that are designed to 
disrupt the political or economic system of another country, without a 
particular intention to cause the target State to change its policy or 
decision.26  
 
21 See, eg, C Walton, ‘Spies, Election Meddling, and Disinformation: Past and 
Present’ (2019) 26 Brown Journal of World Affairs 107. 
22 Cf H Lahmann, ‘Information Operations and the Question of Illegitimate 
Interference under International Law’ (2020) 53 Israel Law Review 189, 209-
12. 
23 J Wright, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’ (23 May 2018), 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-
international-law-in-the-21st-century.  
24 P C Ney Jr, ‘DoD General Counsel Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command 
Legal Conference’ (2 March 2020), available at 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-
general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/.  
25 B J Egan, ‘Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace’ (10 
November 2016), available at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm.  
26 M N Schmitt, ‘The Defense Department’s Measured Take on International 
Law in Cyberspace’, Just Security (11 March 2020), available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/69119/the-defense-departments-measured-take-
on-international-law-in-cyberspace/. See also J D Ohlin, Election Interference: 
International Law and the Future of Democracy (2020) 82-5. 
Accepted for publication by the  
Australian Year Book of International Law 
 
NOT FOR CIRCULATION 
7 
 
The Australian Government has interpreted coercive means as 
interferences that ‘effectively deprive another state of the ability to 
control, decide upon or govern matters of an inherently sovereign 
nature’.27 According to this position, the intention to change the target 
State’s policy or decision is not material to its assessment of foreign 
interferences under the principle of non-intervention. Instead, the mere 
fact that the State has lost control over an inherently governmental 
function would be sufficient to satisfy the standard of coerciveness. It 
reflects the growing concern among political circles about increasingly 
sophisticated attempts by foreign powers to influence domestic political 
processes, which resulted in the enactment of the National Security 
Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 
2018.28 
The standard may even be further relaxed to extend the reach of this 
principle to the dissemination of misinformation that generates dissent 
or encourages insurgency. 29  However, given the diffused nature of 
threats posed by misinformation, the causal nexus between information 
operations and their coercive effect inevitably becomes tenuous. 
Although it is widely accepted that the principle applies to indirect 
means of intervention,30 there are practical difficulties in establishing 
the coercive nature of information operations because indirect causation 
necessarily moves such activities in the direction of permissible 
interference and away from intervention.31 It remains to be seen if the 
 
27  Government of Australia, ‘Supplement to Australia’s Position on the 




28 Nigel Brew, ‘Foreign Interference – Neither New Nor Limited to China’ 
(Parliament of Australia, 20 September 2019), available at 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parli
amentary_Library/FlagPost/2019/September/Foreign_interference.  
29 See Jamnejad and Wood, above n 16, 374. See also Nicholas Tsagourisas, 
‘Electoral Cyber Interference, Self-Determination and the Principle of Non-
Intervention in Cyberspace’, EJIL: Talk! (26 August 2019), available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/electoral-cyber-interference-self-determination-and-
the-principle-of-non-intervention-in-cyberspace/ (considering interference in 
the process of the formation of sovereign authority as coercive); but see Ohlin, 
above n 26, 103-4.  
30 M N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Operations (2017) r 66 para 24 [hereinafter Tallinn Manual 2.0]. 
31 M N Schmitt, ‘“Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in 
the Grey Zones of International Law’ (2018) 19 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 30, 51-2. 
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general practice among States evolves to extend the scope of 
prohibition to information operations, which are not intended to change 
the target State’s policy or to deprive it of the ability to function but 
rather to reduce its effectiveness, for example, by subverting public 
health measures to protect the population against the spread of 
infectious diseases.  
Information operations could amount to an intervention only if such an 
operation is attributable to a State. When there is no clear evidence of 
attribution, the question might nonetheless arise whether the State has 
an obligation of due diligence to ensure that its territory is not 
knowingly used as a base, by a non-state actor or another State, for 
violations of international law. 32   This means that States might be 
required to take feasible measures against those who are disseminating 
misinformation in a manner which would disrupt the operation of a 
public health system of another State in combating the spread of 
infectious diseases. There are reports suggesting that State-sponsored 
media outlets from China, Iran, Russia and Turkey have been 
generating and disseminating misinformation in European languages.33 
There could be a potential ground for claiming State responsibility, in 
cases where such information operations amount to an infringement 
upon another State’s sovereignty or to an intervention by causing 
sustained disruption of the latter’s public health system.  
It is even possible to envisage situations where a State may assert a 
breach of the principle of non-use of force when a foreign military force 
engages in disinformation campaigns with the intention to cause a 
greater number of deaths resulting from the uncontrollable spread of 
infectious diseases. Indeed, multiple States have adopted the view that 
hostile activities by non-traditional means, such as cyber operations, 
can constitute a use of force when the scale and effects of such activities 
are comparable to those of a conventional act of violence covered by 
the prohibition.34 However, the causal link between the dissemination 
 
32 Tallinn Manual 2.0, above n 29, r 6 para 27. 
33 K Rebello et al, ‘Covid-19 News and Information from State-Backed Outlets 
Targeting French, German and Spanish-Speaking Social Media Users’ 




34 See, eg, Government of Australia, ‘Australia’s Position on the Application 
of International Law to State Conduct in Cyberspace’ (2017) s 1; Government 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, ‘Letter of 5 July 2019 from the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of Representatives on the 
International Legal Order in Cyberspace’ (2019) Appendix, 3; Ministère des 
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of misinformation and physical harm is rather tenuous, which could 
make States reluctant to accept such characterisation.  
 
III FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Domestically, regulatory responses to misinformation are likely to 
cause tension with individual freedom of expression, in cases where 
there are relevant human rights obligations under international law, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),35 or under municipal law, such as the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.36 Such obligations impose legal constraints 
upon the ability of national authorities to suppress or prevent the spread 
of misinformation. However, freedom of expression is not guaranteed 
without any qualification or exceptions. National authorities are 
generally allowed to restrict freedom of expression when requisite 
requirements are met.37 Moreover, the ICCPR specifically proscribes 
any propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.38 
With the global outbreak of COVID-19, numerous criminal 
prosecutions have been launched to combat misinformation in different 
jurisdictions. On 15 March 2020, Elijah Muthui Kitonyo was arrested 
in Kenya for publishing false information regarding COVID-19 on his 
 
Armées, ‘Droit international appliqué aux opérations dans le cyberespace’ 
(2019) s 1.1.2; Wright, above n 22; Ney, above n 23; H H Koh, ‘International 
Law in Cyberspace’ (2012) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 3-4.  
35 ICCPR, above n 14, arts 2(1), 19(2). See also Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
adopted 23 May 2004 (entered into force 15 March 2008), reprinted in (2005) 
12 International Human Rights Reports 893, art 32; African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into 
force 21 October 1986) art 9(2); American Convention on Human Rights, 
adopted 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) 
art 13; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, adopted 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 
September 1953) art 10. 
36 It reads: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances’.  
37 For detailed analysis, see R K Helm and H Nasu, ‘Regulatory Responses to 
“Fake News” and Freedom of Expression: Normative and Empirical 
Evaluation’ (2021) 21 Human Rights Law Review 302. 
38 ICCPR, above n 15, art 20. See generally M G Kearney, The Prohibition of 
Propaganda for War in International Law (2007). 
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Twitter account.39 In Mauritius, Jahmeel Peerally was arrested on 25 
March 2020 for falsely claiming that riots had erupted after the prime 
minister announced the closure of supermarkets and shops as a response 
to COVID-19.40 In the same country, Rachna Seenauth was arrested on 
15 April 2020 for fabricating a ‘breaking news’ regarding a conference 
call to discuss the ‘miracle treatment’ for COVID-19.41 In South Africa, 
several people have been charged for spreading false information 
regarding COVID-19. 42  There are also numerous counts of 
misinformation removed or blocked on social media and other 
corrective measures in an attempt to suppress the impact of 
misinformation.  
The legality of these measures depends on whether such restrictions on 
freedom of expression are justifiable on legitimate grounds as provided 
in the relevant treaty instrument or under domestic law. There are 
certain requirements that are commonly observed across different 
jurisdictions, such as the tests of necessity and proportionality. 
However, the specific legal requirements for restriction or standards to 
be applied in evaluating the lawfulness of restriction varies in each 
jurisdiction. Therefore, any categorical denial of regulatory measures, 
such as the UN Special Rapporteur’s statement that ‘the penalization of 
disinformation is disproportionate’,43 is misleading and does not help 
guide national authorities in finding an appropriate balance between 
combating misinformation and respecting freedom of expression in the 
 
39 B Senne, ‘Kenyan Man Arrested for Spreading Fake News on Coronavirus’, 
Times Live (16 March 2020), available at 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2020-03-16-kenyan-man-arrested-
for-spreading-fake-news-on-coronavirus/>  
40 L Sophie, ‘Fake News: Jahmeel Peerally arrêté’, Soutenex Lexpress.mu (25 
March 2020), available at <https://www.lexpress.mu/article/373277/fake-
news-jahmeel-peerally-arrete>.   
41  T Mendel, ‘Mauritius: “Fake News” Arrest for Political Satire Not 
Legitimate’ (Centre for Law and Democracy, 17 April 2020), available at 
<https://www.law-democracy.org/live/mauritius-fake-news-arrest-for-
political-satire-not-legitimate/>  
42 A Nyathi, R Thaw and K Palm, ‘Cele: 8 People Arrested for Spreading Fake 
News on COVID-19’, Eyewitness News (7 April 2020), available at 
<https://ewn.co.za/2020/04/07/cele-8-people-arrested-for-spreading-fake-
news-on-covid-19>.  
43 D Kaye, ‘Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and Expression: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’, UN Doc A/HRC/44/49 (23 April 
2020) para 42. 
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course of developing regulatory responses that are both effective and 
norm compliant. 
The extent to which, and circumstances in which, restrictions on the 
dissemination of misinformation is justifiable depends on the 
construction of a particular provision in which freedom of expression is 
guaranteed. Under the ICCPR, for example, contracting parties are 
allowed to impose restrictions on any form of expression or means of 
its dissemination, including systems to support such communication, 
such as Internet service providers or search engines, to the extent 
necessary for the protection of national security, public order, public 
health or morals. 44  It is thus conceivable that restrictions on 
misinformation regarding health-threatening activities are deemed 
necessary and justifiable on public health grounds.45  The European 
Court of Human Rights has, on the other hand, granted contracting 
parties a margin of appreciation in determining what is necessary to 
protect the competing interests identified as the permissible grounds for 
restricting freedom of expression, especially in cases where there is no 
European consensus on how to regulate an emerging or divisive 
problem.46 
States may also be entitled to declare a public emergency to derogate 
from certain obligations to protect human rights, as many countries did 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The declarations of derogation made 
during the pandemic have mainly focused on the right to liberty, 
freedom of movement and freedom of assembly to justify lockdown 
measures.47 In its statement issued on 30 April 2020, the Human Rights 
 
44  Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 34’, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) para 43. See generally K Jakubowicz, 
‘Early Days: The UN, ICTs and Freedom of Expression’ in T McGonagle and 
Y Donders (eds), The United Nations and Freedom of Expression and 
Information: Critical Perspectives (CUP 2015) 304; A Puddephatt, ‘Freedom 
of Expression Rights in the Digital Age’ (Open Society Foundation, April 
2011) 6. 
45 See P M Taylor, A Commentary on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (2020) at 574; W A Schabas, Nowak’s CCPR Commentary 
(3rd edn 2019) 572. 
46  See, eg, Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom App no 
488/76/08 (ECtHR, 22 April 2013) para 123; TV Vest AS and Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v Norway App no 21132/05 (ECtHR, 11 December 2008) para 
67; Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) 
para 57. See generally Bychawska-Siniarska, Protecting the Right to Freedom 
of Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of 
Europe 2017) 44-62. 
47 ICCPR, above n 14, arts 9, 12 and 21 respectively. 
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Committee urged States Parties not to rely on derogation, where their 
public health or other public policy objectives can be attained by 
restricting the rights or introducing reasonable limitations in conformity 
with the provisions for such restrictions and limitations set out in the 
ICCPR.48 This statement suggests that even during a public emergency, 
the Committee is of the view that States should, in the first place, make 
use of the restrictions available under each provision, while 
acknowledging that freedom of expression and information constitutes 
important safeguards for ensuring compliance with their obligations 
under the ICCPR in the exercise of emergency powers.49 
However, various restrictive measures to prevent and suppress the 
dissemination of misinformation are not completely effective due to 
practical constraints. There are technical difficulties with policing all 
the communications on social media platforms. A threat of sanctions or 
blocking of communication does not deter everyone from spreading 
misinformation or engaging in disinformation campaigns. This is 
especially the case when those responsible for generating or 
disseminating misinformation are operating from foreign jurisdictions. 
The criminal law approach therefore has its limit in the absence of 
international legal mechanisms for mutual cooperation in law 
enforcement between relevant countries. Because of this limitation, 
some States may resort to extra-territorial suppressive measures by 
engaging in cyber operations to disrupt disinformation campaigns at 
their sources, as the United States and the United Kingdom did against 
the so-called Islamic State,50 to the extent that it does not amount to an 
infringement upon the sovereignty of another State,51 or to a prohibited 
intervention as discussed earlier. 
 
 
48  ‘Statement on Derogations from the Covenant in connection with the 
COVID-19 Pandemic’, UN Doc CCPR/C/128/2 (30 April 2020) para 2(c). 
49 Ibid para 2(f). 
50 ‘UK Targeted ISIS Drones and Online Servers in Cyber Attack’, Financial 
Times (7 February 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/360a8e1c-
b241-40f7-b944-45a4f8854ac5; ‘UK Launched Cyber-Attack on Islamic 
State’, BBC News (12 April 2018), available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43738953.  
51 For debate regarding the respect for sovereignty as a rule of international 
law applicable in cyberspace, see G P Corn and R Taylor, ‘Sovereignty in the 
Age of Cyber’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 207-12; M N Schmitt and L Vihul, 
‘Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 
213-8; M N Schmitt and L Vihul, ‘Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace’ 
(2017) 95 Texas Law Review 1639.  
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Within the existing framework of international law, States are not 
prohibited from disseminating misinformation in another State unless it 
amounts to an intervention due to the coercive nature of interference 
with the domestic affairs of the latter State. There are indications in 
State practice that the substantive standard for coerciveness might be 
shifting towards extending the reach of this principle to the 
dissemination of misinformation that generates dissent or encourages 
insurgency. However, because of the unique online information 
environment where threats posed by misinformation are diffused in 
nature, there are technical difficulties in establishing the causal nexus 
between information operations and their coercive effect or clear 
evidence for attribution of these operations to a State. There is also a 
question as to whether the State has an obligation of due diligence to 
ensure that its territory is not knowingly used as a base, by a non-state 
actor or another State, for violations of international law through the 
dissemination of misinformation. 
On the domestic front, States reserve the sovereign right to develop and 
employ any effective means of combating misinformation within their 
own jurisdiction, to the extent that associated restrictions on freedom of 
expression are tailored and justifiable under the applicable rules of 
international or domestic human rights law. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of the ‘infodemic’ disrupting government response to the 
spread of coronavirus has shown that many national authorities are yet 
to develop an effective and norm-compliant system to suppress or 
eliminate the harmful impact of misinformation. There is also a limit to 
the criminal law approach in combating information operations 
originating from foreign jurisdictions, in the absence of international 
legal mechanisms for mutual cooperation in law enforcement. 
Between these two possible legal solutions lies a swath of unregulated 
space in which hostile actors can launch information operations by 
disseminating misinformation without assuming any legal liability. 
This space will remain wide open for exploitation as long as the strict 
standard is maintained for assessing coerciveness of foreign 
interference as the requisite element of intervention prohibited under 
customary international law or by worshipping freedom of expression 
with the categorical denial of regulatory measures to suppress 
misinformation. The traditional framework of international law, which 
has been built upon the premise that the free flow of information helps 
sustain and promote liberalism, does not provide adequate protection 
against the rise of information disorder disrupting government response 
to a public health crisis.  
Accepted for publication by the  
Australian Year Book of International Law 
 
NOT FOR CIRCULATION 
14 
 
Equally concerning is the exploitability of misinformation when it is 
employed as part of hybrid threats, combined with military operations 
such as cyber attacks, to disrupt the regulatory system that the target 
State has in place for responding to a public health crisis. Such hybrid 
threats may exploit a legal ‘grey zone’, where it is unclear how the 
conduct should be legally characterised due to the lack of a clear and 
shared understanding of what constitutes an intervention and the 
circumstances in which States are required to exercise due diligence 
under general international law. In such situations, the defending State 
is left with difficult choice between the pursuit of peaceful solutions,52 
and, taking risks of legal uncertainty, the adoption of unilateral remedial 
measures such as extra-territorial suppressive measures through cyber 
operations to disrupt disinformation campaigns at their sources.  
 
52 Cf ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic 
of China in Joint Press Conference’ (The White House, 25 September 2015) 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint> (in relation 
to cyber espionage). 
